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This note reflects work which has been proceeding in the IDS on the
potential impact of trade liberalization in developed countries on
unemployment and poverty in developing countries, (Singeretal.).
This work is set in the context of the general concern of the Institute
with problems of employment and income distribution in poor coun-
tries. Our interest has therefore been less in the overall benefits from
trade than in the distribution of those benefits - that is, the degree
to which increased export opportunities could help to relieve poverty
and unemployment in all developing countries, and could be of par-
ticular assistance to the poorest and least-developed countries. The
work has two principal elements: first, the construction of a frame-
work for analysing the impact of trade liberalization, and second, the
implications of such an analysis for a poverty and unemployment-
oriented trade liberalization policy in developed countries.
Traditional trade theory argues that the benefit of trade liberaliza-
tion to exporters is that it increases their export earnings. It does so
in two ways:
it can raise the price received by exporters for their existing
exports. This will normally be the immediate effect of tariff
preferences or reductions in the general levels of import duty; the
level of increase depending on the relative supply and demand
elasticity in the exporting and importing countries;
it can lead to an increase in the quantity of exports.
In the short run (when productive capacity in the exporting country
may be assumed to be fixed) it can bring unused capacity into
production. In the long run, it can lead to investment in the export
industry and a consequent increase in export capacity. The extent to
which this happens will depend on the long-term elasticity of supply
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of the export and the duration and certainty of the liberalization
measure in question. Short duration or uncertainty (e.g. variable
quotas or escape clauses) may inhibit the investment required to
increase export capacity, and will thus lessen total benefit.
This benefit is achieved at some cost in the exporting country. The
extent of this cost will depend on the level of unused resources in the
country - i.e. the scope for vent from surplus.
In so far as countries tend to export goods which are intensive in
locally plentiful factors of production, the neo-classical theory would
argue that an increase in exports from poor countries, where labour
is plentiful and capital scarce, would tend to favour labour-intensive
industries and would thus be particularly beneficial for employment.
Since labour is less productive in poor countries than in rich
countries (being combined with smaller average capital inputs) an
increase in exports from poor countries which replace domestic
production in rich countries will create more direct jobs in the
exporting country than are lost in the importing country.
The most recent empirical study in this area is that carried out for
the ILO by Lydall, who distinguishes four effects on employment of
increased exports (his work is confined to manufacturers and
processed products).
These are:
the direct effects on employment in the exporting and importing
countries. These are the additional people employed in the
export industry and the fall in employment in the industry in the
importing country;
inter-industry or linkage effects on employment in the exporting
country. These are the additional jobs created in industries
producing direct or indirect inputs for the export industry, and
are estimated by the use of input-output tables;
multiplier effects on employment resulting from the additional
domestic expenditure generated by incomes in the export
industry. These are calculated by Lydall from data on import
propensities;
expenditure effects, or the impact on employment in developed
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countries of increased developing country imports resulting from
these increased exports. It is assumed that all the additional
export earnings are spent directly or indirectly on imports from
the developed countries.'
This model is necessarily simplified, and many factors which are not
easily susceptible to cross-country analysis have been ignored. But on
the basis of his framework, Lydall's conclusions tend to confirm the
presumptions of the neo-classical approach. Generally, the poorer the
country, the more jobs are created for a given quantum of increased
exports. Thus, whereas over ten jobs will be directly created in a
country with an average per capita income of $100 for each
additional $10,000 of value added in industry, under three jobs will
be created by a similar increase in industrial exports in a country
with an average per capita income of $1,000. The actual number of
jobs created will of course vary from industry to industry, and the
variation between the labour requirements of labour and capital
intensive industries will be larger in poor than in rich countries. Thus
whereas the ratio of additional employment created by a quantum of
exports in labour and capital intensive industries in a country with an
average per capita income of $1,000 is 2.4:1, the ratio in a country
with an average per capita income of $100 is 3:1. But these
proportionate comparisons understate the differences. In absolute
terms, the difference between the employment created by labour and
capital intensive industries is 4.5 times as great in the $100 per
annum country as in the $1,000 per annum country. Thus measures
designed to increase exports of labour-intensive products are likely to
have most direct impact on employment in the poorest countries.
Similarly, Lydall's estimates not only confirm that the direct loss of
jobs in importing countries as a result of trade liberalization is far
smaller than the number of jobs directly created in the exporting
countries, but also suggest that, when the secondary effects on
developed countries' exports are taken into account, there can, at
least in respect of some industries be a net increase in the total level
'With the increases in oil prices, this assumption appears less plausible. For
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of employment. It is misleading to consider trade liberalization by
rich countries as in some sense a 'concession'; rich and poor countries
are playing a non-zero sum game, in which both may benefit as a
result of more liberal import policies in the developed world.
We may use calculations of this kind to make a rough estimate of the
total potential impact of trade liberalization on employment in
developing countries. Thus, between 1955 and 1970, the less
developed countries' share in world trade fell from 25.3 per cent to
17.6 per cent. If the 1970 share had been the same as the 1955 share,
developing country exports would have been 43 per cent greater. On
very rough assumptions, such an additional level of exports would
have given rise, both directly and indirectly, to employment equiva-
lent to some 15 per cent of the labour force in less developed
countries other than China (Tyler). If, as Singer estimates, unemploy-
ment in developing countries averages some 20-25 per cent of the
labour force, such an increase in exports would make a very
substantial impact on unemployment in the Third World.
All this is consistent with the neo-classical view of world trade. Its
weakness lies in its omission of social, political and institutional
factors which profoundly affect the distribution of benefits from
trade. The only qualifying factor which Lydall, for example, takes
into account is income per head in the countries concerned. But
there are many other complicating and modifying elements which
need to be brought into the calculations:
if production and trade are under the control of multinational
companies with a narrow range of activities, both linkage and
multiplier effects may be very weak. Linkages may be primarily
with activities elsewhere in the corporation's network. Since
much of the export revenue may be exported in the form of
profits, dividends, service payments and management charges, the
local multiplier impact will be weak. Moreover, the input-output
type of analysis is static; it does not take into consideration the
longer term impact on employment. This will depend on the level
and disposition of the surplus derived from export production. If
the surplus is channelled abroad, the long-term effects on
employment may be very feeble;
if the local social structure and political system operate in such a
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way as to encourage a high degree of inequality, the benefit of
export industries to the poor will be very limited. Moreover, such
inequalities may involve both a high demand for imports and the
leakage abroad of much of the surplus accruing from export
industries. Similarly, government policies in many areas such as
taxation, education and technology will substantially influence
the direct and indirect effects of export industries;
(c) if export industries develop at the expense of industries which
previously served the domestic market, there could well be a net
loss of jobs. The export industry, designed to meet foreign
demand for standardised products, might both use more capital
intensive methods than industries for the home market and draw
to a greater extent on foreign inputs.
Thus, although the neo-classical approach suggests the potential
benefits to employment and poverty relief accruing from the
expansion of trade, the degree to which these benefits are actually
realized will depend on institutional, political and social factors
which are outside its range. This has important policy implications. If
developed country governments wish to liberalize trade in ways
which will provide most benefit for employment and the relief of
poverty, they will necessarily give first priority to labour-intensive
products (although these are normally 'sensitive' industries in the
importing countries, which exert pressure for protective policies).
But beyond this, there may be an argument for trade liberalization to
be confined to products originating in countries where the social,
political and institutional framework is such that there is a fair
presumption that poverty will be relieved and employment created.
Country selectivity in trading arrangements is not new. For a mixture
of political and commercial motives, trading blocs such as the
Commonwealth Preference area and the countries of the Yaoundé
Convention have provided selective access to developed country
markets. When the Yaoundé Convention is revised as a result of
Britain's admission to the EEC, it will still be a highly selective
arrangement. Many of the poorest countries such as India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Indonesia will not be covered by it. It could be
argued that a system of selectivity based on criteria of employment
creation and poverty relief would be an improvement over the
existing commercially and politically motivated selectivity.
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But such country selectivity may create more difficulties than it
solves. First, the selection of 'desirable' beneficiaries involves the
importing countries in sitting in judgment on the exporting
countries. Such judgments will involve similar types of consideration
to those which govern present country selectivity, and will certainly
be regarded by the developing countries as colonialism under another
name.
Moreover, country selectivity weakens the bargaining power of the
developing countries in trade negotiations. UNCTAD studies have
shown that poor countries are likely to receive far fewer concessions
than rich countries in international trade bargaining (such as under
the Kennedy Round). This is partly a reflection of the arrangements
governing such negotiations. But it is also a result of the weak
bargaining position of the developing countries. Such negotiations
typically involve the striking of bargains between powerful industrial
countries and groups of countries, in which concessions are made on
products of mutual interest. Concessions are likely to be far fewer on
products of little interest to the developed countries. The principal
potential bargaining counter that developing countries could have in
such circumstances would be their adoption of a joint negotiating
position. But the effect of selective liberalization - whether on the
lines of the existing preferential areas or in the form of supposedly
poverty-oriented trade policies - is to create differences of interest
between groups of developing countries, and to render even less
probable the chances of any joint strategy for trade concessions from
the developed countries. Thus such liberalization might in practice be
another form of colonialism and a means of maintaining the
supremacy of the already industrialized countries.
Lastly, country selectivity must vary over time, if only because
governments and social systems change. A government whose policies
help the poor may be overthrown. Of course changes of government
in developing countries have frequently led to changes in developed
country trade policies. United States policy towards Cuba is an
obvious example. But, apart from the disadvantages of such change-
able trade regimes (to which I shall return later), the advocacy of
country-selective trade policies for what appear to be progressive
ends may merely serve to give an air of respectability to similarly
selective trade policies undertaken for quite different purposes.
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Country selectivity could be understood in a narrower sense. Thus
trade liberalization could be applied specifically to the poorest and
least developed countries. However, such selectivity would involve
first, a difficult (and highly political) task in identifying the countries
who would receive the benefits of such liberalization, and secondly,
discrimination against the other developing countries. Both the
neo-classical theory and Lydall's work would imply that the liberali-
zation of imports of labour-intensive products would be most
employment-creating in the poorest countries, if they are in a
position to expand their exports. But the growth in export capability
will depend less on market access as such than on the supply of
relevant know-how, the adaptation of institutions and the trans-
formation of local economies. Thus the selective application of trade
liberalization to the poorest countries might in any event be
ineffective in stimulating employment-creating exports.
Although our approach would suggest that there is no certainty
about the employment stimulating effects of trade liberalizatioh
measures, the attempt to cope with this problem through systems of
country-selective trade concessions has severe disadvantages. If this
view is accepted, it follows that there is no way of directly matching
trade liberalization measures with the creation of employment in
developing countries. All that trade liberalization can do is to create
the possibility of more effective poverty and unemployment policies
inside developing countries. It cannot of itself ensure that such
policies will be formulated or implemented.
But this does not mean that there are no criteria which can be
applied to trade liberalization measures so as to increase their
relevance to employment creation programmes. The following are
some obvious considerations:
(a) Products. We have already argued that first priority should be
given to the liberalization of trade in agricultural products and
labour-intensive manufactures (including craft products).
Unfortunately it is in this area that trade liberalization
encounters most opposition in developed countries. The farm
lobby in the EEC and the political influence of manufacturers of
labour intensive products are two well-known examples. As Hans
Singer has said the export of labour-intensive products from
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developing countries attracts restrictions as a jam-pot attracts
wasps. Such a liberalization policy is therefore inseparable from
effective adjustment assistance and regional policies inside
developed countries.
Foreign Exchange. The increase in oil prices has served to
highlight the balance of payments constraints governing employ-
ment policy in many developing countries. In some of the
poorest countries, the most immediate prospects for increasing
foreign exchange earnings lie in the processing of their own raw
materials or agricultural products. The lowering of rates of
effective protection on such industries in developed countries
could therefore be of special help in this area.
Duration and Certainty. The benefits of trade liberalization take
time to work themselves out. This is especially so in the poorest
exporting countries. But in all countries any sizeable increase in
exports will involve new investment in the export industry, and
this will be deterred if trade liberalization measures are of short
duration or uncertain application (e.g. through variable quotas).
We have argued that a neo-classical analysis of the impact of exports
on employment is inadequate. But the policy measures which we
suggest for developed country liberalization policies are in fact
indistinguishable from those suggested by neo-classical economists
(see e.g. Johnson). This conclusion may appear paradoxical. What it
implies is that, in so far as social, institutional and political structures
inside developing countries stand in the way of an ideal pattern of
income distribution or employment creation, this can be remedied
only by the people of the exporting country itself. If these con-
straints reflect the working of a world system of concentration of
power within a few multinational corporations, developed country
policies which do nothing about the structure but which attempt,
within this framework, to favour those countries which appear best
to surmount the constraints, appear doomed to failure. Any selective
trade policy, however well-intentioned, will be caught up in the
system and will merely serve in the end to aid the interests of the
existing power structure.
What lines of work does this approach suggest? A clear conclusion is
that we need to know far more about the impact of institutional
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arrangements in production and trade. What is the differential short
and long run impact on employment of, for example, export crops
produced by peasants and those produced by plantations? And what
difference does it make if the plantations are owned prcdominantly
by nationals (as in Mauritius) or by foreign companies? Or again,
what is the relative impact on employment of different patterns of
industrial exports - e.g. through multinational corporations
(runaway industries) or through national capitalists or public enter-
prise? A wide range of alternative arrangements in production and
trade could be examined from this point of view.
The Lydall method offers a useful first approach, but it needs to be
extended. First, different institutional arrangements will affect the
distribution of the benefits from trade between exporters and
importers. Secondly, if we are concerned with the long run impact of
exports on employment, we need to know how much surplus is
produced in the export industry, who controls its distribution and
use, and what is its final disposition. Lastly, we must treat linkage
effects in a rather broader context than the input-output framework.
Do different styles of organization have different impacts on the
development of local skills or technology? These may be the most
important long-run benefits of exports to the relief of poverty and
unemployment.
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